Journal Article

Controlling Coalitions: Social Lending at the Multilateral Development Banks

Date Published

Dec 1, 2009

Authors

Mona Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney

Publisher

The Review of International Organizations

Citation

Lyne, M. M., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2009). Controlling coalitions: Social lending at the multilateral development banks. The Review of International Organizations, 4(4), 407-433. doi:10.1007/s11558-009-9069-2

Announcement

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) dramatically increased social lending for health, education, and safety nets after 1985. Yet the great powersÕ social policy preferences remained relatively static from 1980 to 2000. This contradicts the conventional view that powerful states control IOs. We argue that highly institutionalized IOs like MDBs require a complete model of possible member-state coalitions encompassing the preferences of all member statesÑnot just major powers. We develop multiple measures of state preferences and include all member states in our coalitional model. We evaluate our model and alternatives with an analysis of more than 10,000 MDB loans from 1980 to 2000. We find that when we include all member states weighted by their voting shares, principal preferences are significantly related to lending outcomes.

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Mona Lyne

Mona Lyne

Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Missouri-Kansas City

Dan Nielson

Dan Nielson

Professor and Associate Chair of Political Science at Brigham Young University

Mike Tierney

Mike Tierney

Co-Director of the Global Research Institute and Hylton Professor of Government and International Relations at the College of William & Mary

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