Journal Article

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

Date Published

Feb 1, 2016

Authors

Helen V. Milner, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael G. Findley

Publisher

Citation

Milner, H. V., Nielson, D. L., & Findley, M. G. (2016). Citizen preferences and public goods: Comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda. The Review of International Organizations, 11(2), 219-245. doi:10.1007/s11558-016-9243-2

Journal Article

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

Date Published

Feb 1, 2016

Authors

Helen V. Milner, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael G. Findley

Citation

Milner, H. V., Nielson, D. L., & Findley, M. G. (2016). Citizen preferences and public goods: Comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda. The Review of International Organizations, 11(2), 219-245. doi:10.1007/s11558-016-9243-2

Different theories about the impact of aid make distinct predictions about citizensÕ attitudes toward foreign aid in recipient countries. We investigate their preferences toward aid and government projects in order to examine these different theories. Are citizens indifferent between development projects funded by their own government versus those funded by foreign aid donors, as aid capture theory suggests? To address this, in an experiment on a large, representative sample of Ugandan citizens, we randomly assigned the names of funding groups for actual forthcoming development projects and invited citizens to express support attitudinally and behaviorally. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to show behavioral support in favor of foreign aid projects compared to government programs, especially if they already perceive the government as corrupt or clientelist or if they are not supporters of the ruling party. They also trust donors more, think they are more effective, and do not consistently oppose aid conditionality. This experimental evidence is consistent with a theory that we call donor control which sees donors asbeing able to target and condition aid so that it is not fungible with government revenues and thus to be able to better direct it to meet citizensÕ needs.

No items found.
No items found.
No items found.