The Speed of Aid: Strategic Urgency in International Emergency Relief

Timely assistance is a precondition for effective emergency relief in the aftermath of natural disasters. This paper shows that donor countries take faster aid decisions if they have stronger strategic interests at stake. We analyze a trilateral panel (donor, donor, recipient) of daily humanitarian aid decisions of 43 donor countries following 516 fast-onset natural disasters between 2000 and 2022. Identification relies on daily variation in donor responses and a series of multidimensional fixed effects. Our analysis reveals a bandwagon effect as donors follow their peers’ commitments. This is largely explained by trade competition: the more donors compete over export and import markets, the faster they react to each other. The results are driven by government to-government aid and underscore the importance of recipient-specific lead donors, who are natural first movers. These findings suggest that commercial competition can distort emergency relief and highlight that strategic interests shape even ostensibly altruistic behavior in international humanitarian aid.