Journal Article

The Political Economy of Aid Allocation in Africa: Evidence from Zambia

Date Published

Feb 1, 2018

Authors

Takaaki Masaki

Publisher

Citation

Masaki, T. (2018). The Political Economy of Aid Allocation in Africa: Evidence from Zambia. African Studies Review, 61(01), 55-82. doi:10.1017/asr.2017.97

Note: A version of this article was previously published as an AidData Working Paper.

Journal Article

The Political Economy of Aid Allocation in Africa: Evidence from Zambia

Date Published

Feb 1, 2018

Authors

Takaaki Masaki

Citation

Masaki, T. (2018). The Political Economy of Aid Allocation in Africa: Evidence from Zambia. African Studies Review, 61(01), 55-82. doi:10.1017/asr.2017.97

This article utilizes a newly available dataset on the geographical distribution of development projects in Zambia to test whether electoral incentives shape aid allocation at the subnational level. Based on this dataset, it argues that when political elites have limited information to target distributive goods specifically to swing voters, they allocate more donor projects to districts where opposition to the incumbent is strong, as opposed to districts where the incumbent enjoys greater popularity.

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